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What Makes Merit Selection Different?
Rachel Paine Caufield, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION
The framers of the American Constitution were clear in their
intent that the judicial branch should be free from political
influence. As Alexander Hamilton noted in Federalist No. 78,
good judges are few, and every care should to be taken to
guarantee that those who are best qualified will be appointed.'
Once appointed, they must be independent from politics, insulated
from both partisan influence and the public mood, free from the
damaging effects of political retribution.2 Although the federal
judiciary continues to exemplify many of these fundamental
ideals,3 states continue to debate these principles. At the core of
the debate is the fundamental notion of the importance of the
judge within a democratic system of justice.
Writing in 1922, Benjamin Cardozo noted that "there is no
guarantee of justice . .. except the personality of the judge."4 The
heart and soul of any justice system is the judge, the impartial
arbiter who weighs competing arguments in the quest to
* Associate Professor, Drake University Department of Politics and
International Relations; Research Fellow, Elmo B. Hunter Citizens Center for
Judicial Selection, The American Judicature Society.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
2. Id.
3. The federal judicial selection process has, throughout U.S. history,
been inherently and unabashedly political. For an excellent discussion, see
JOHN ANTHONY MALTESE, THE SELLING OF SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (The
Johns Hopkins University Press 1998). While the process of selection may be
political, however, Article III judges in the federal system still retain tenure
for good behavior, as well as protection from declining salaries. This ensures
that, once seated, individual judges maintain decisional independence.
4. BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 16-17
(Yale University Press 1922).
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determine how legal principles apply to specific case facts.
Maurice Rosenberg wrote that:
Justice is an alloy of men and mechanisms in which, as
Roscoe Pound remarked, "men count more than
machinery." Assume the clearest rules, the most
enlightened procedures, the most sophisticated court
techniques; the key factor is still the judge. . . . The
reason the judge makes or breaks the system of justice is
that rules are not self-declaring or self-applying. Even in
a government of laws, men make decisions.5
The acknowledgement that people matter as much as (if not more
than) the law implies that an assessment of any system of judicial
selection will ultimately rely on an assessment of the people
chosen within that system.
As the name implies, merit selection was designed to ensure
that judges would be selected on the basis of professional merit,
including professional qualifications, experience, legal expertise,
impartiality, and temperament. Before evaluating whether merit
selection systems populate the bench with individuals who are
qualitatively different than those judges chosen in popular
elections, the historical and political roots of the movement are
relevant and informative as they clarify expectations. Although
today's merit selection advocates may put forward any number of
claims regarding the benefits of adoption, returning to the
foundational claims will provide a more authentic means of
comparison.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT TO MERIT SELECTION
Merit selection, as a conceptual theme, makes a claim about
the type of individuals who will be chosen to serve as judges.6 But
the historical movement to merit selection is less about the types
of judges chosen than about the manipulation of political
5. Maurice Rosenberg, The Qualities of Justice - Are They Strainable?,
in JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE: SELECTED READINGS 1 (Glenn R. Winters,
Ed., Am. Judicature Society 1973).
6. As just one example, see The American Judicature Society's guide
explaining the merit selection system. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MERIT
SELECTION: THE BEST WAY TO CHOOSE THE BEST JUDGES, available at
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/ms-descrip_118546220212
0.pdf.
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processes prior to the adoption of commission-based merit
selection processes.7 As the cases outlined below indicate, the
movement to adopt merit selection was more frequently a
practical effort to minimize the effect of overt political
considerations in judicial appointment processes and thereby, to
better guarantee the effective and fair application of law for state
citizens.A. The Case of Missouri
Missouri was the first state to adopt merit selection in 1940.8
Like most states, Missouri had a system of gubernatorial
7. "Commission-based appointment" is not necessarily synonymous with
"merit selection," as it is possible to create a commission that would eschew
the values of "merit selection." For example, a party committee may
nominate an individual for the bench, or a group of state legislators may
assess individuals without regard to traditional "merit" considerations (such
as experience, temperament, knowledge of the law, productivity, dignity,
integrity, impartiality, etc). Though many have used the terms
interchangeably, I use "merit selection" to mean a system whereby (1) a
bipartisan commission of non-lawyers and lawyers is established by statute
or constitutional provision; (2) the members of the commission serve fixed
terms; (3) the commission engages in formalized procedures to advertise
judicial vacancies, gather applications, assess individual applicants, and vote
on recommendations; (4) the commission determines which applicants are
best qualified for the position and submits a list of recommendations to the
governor; (5) the governor is bound by the recommendations of the
commission and makes an appointment (with or without legislative consent);
and (6) after serving a fixed term on the bench, the judge is subject to a
retention election. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, MODEL JUDICIAL
SELECTION PROVISIONS (Revised 2008), available at
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/MJSP-ptr_3962CC530180
9.pdf.
8. Hence, "merit selection" is often referred to as "the Missouri Plan."
Although Missouri's Nonpartisan Court Plan remains the longest merit
selection system in operation, two important caveats should be noted. First,
it is a misnomer, as there are many variants of "merit selection," some of
which differ dramatically from Missouri's system. For a comparison of state
systems see AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION:
CURRENT STATUS (2010), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/
documents/JudicialMeritCharts_0FC20225EC6C2.pdf. Second, not all
judges in Missouri are appointed through the Missouri Nonpartisan Court
Plan. Under the state's Constitution, circuit court judges in St. Louis,
Jackson County (Kansas City) are also appointed through merit selection.
The Constitution also permits other counties to adopt merit selection through
a majority vote of citizens living in the circuit, and the plan has been adopted
by Clay, Platte, St. Louis, and Greene Counties in this manner. See
American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselection/methods/selectionofjudges
.cfm?state=MO (last visited May 25, 2010).
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appointment and Senate confirmation modeled on the federal
system9 when it first joined the union in 1821, and, like most
states, Missouri switched to popular election of judges in the mid-
nineteenth century.10 In the 1930s, the Missouri courts fell victim
to machine politics and control by notorious Democratic Party boss
Tom Pendergast.11 After a particularly brutal battle within the
Democratic Party in the 1936 judicial elections, the two factions
joined forces to punish a popular incumbent Supreme Court
justice who had failed to follow Pendergast's political agenda.
Specifically, this justice was ousted from the bench, sending a
message to other judges (and all elected officials) that there were
real repercussions for failing to follow party boss Pendergast.12
Machine politics were so rampant that between 1918 and 1941
only two Supreme Court justices successfully ran for reelection. 13
Meanwhile, Judge Eugene Padberg was elected to the Circuit
Court in the City of St. Louis with significant support from local
party leaders who had put him on the ballot in 1934.14 Although
technically eligible for the bench,15 Padberg had made his living
as a pharmacist before his election. 16 His lack of experience was
used to highlight the excess of party politics.17 His professional
behavior continually favored party elites, most notably when he
chaired a grand jury charged with investigating brazen election
fraud.18 A fellow judge took the unprecedented step of summarily
discharging the grand jury when it became clear that no real effort
9. Judges also had lifetime appointments at the time.
10. Mississippi was the first state to adopt popular elections in 1832.
Missouri amended its Constitution to allow for popular election of judges in
1850. See generally Charles B. Blackmar, Missouri's Nonpartisan Court Plan
from 1942 to 2005, 72 Mo. L. REV. 199 (2007).
11. See LAWRENCE H. LARSEN & NANCY J. HULSTON, PENDERGAST! (1997).
12. Laura Denvir Stith & Jeremy Root, The Missouri Nonpartisan Court
Plan: The Least Political Method of Selecting High Quality Judges, 74 Mo. L.
REV. 711, 722 (2009).
13. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States:
Missouri, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selectionlindex.cfm?state=
MO (last visited Apr. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Judicial Selection in Missouri].
14. The Missouri Bar, http://www.mobar.org/courts/commission-report.
pdf [hereinafter Missouri Bar Commission Report] (last visited Aug. 9, 2010).
15. Padberg was admitted to the Bar in 1927. See id.
16. Blackmar, supra note 10, at 199. See also Missouri Bar Commission
Report, supra note 14, at 22.
17. Missouri Bar Commission Report, supra note 14, at 22-24.
18. Id. at 23.
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was being made to investigate anything - largely because of party
control. 19 The St. Louis Dispatch called his service "a humiliation
to the law and to the city."20
The movement to adopt "the Missouri Plan" was a widespread
public effort to limit party control over the Missouri courts and
stop widespread politicization of judicial decisions. 21 The well-
coordinated campaign of citizens, citizen groups, judges, and
lawyers achieved merit selection by way of popular initiative in
1940.22 Within months, opponents in the state legislature argued
that citizens did not understand the language of the initiative and
demanded a new vote. 23 Thus, in 1942, voters again approved the
initiative, with more than double the support of just two years
earlier.24 In 1945, the Missouri voters adopted a new Constitution
that included the Nonpartisan Court Plan.25
B. The Case of Kansas
In many ways, the experience of Kansas mirrors that of
Missouri. When it joined the union in 1861,26 Kansas (consistent
with the trend of the day) chose judges through popular election,
allowing the Governor to appoint judges to vacancies. 27 A series
of events led to popular dissatisfaction with this system,
culminating in what is referred to as the "triple play" in 1956.28
19. See generally Blackmar, supra note 10.
20. Judicial Selection in Missouri, supra note 13. See also Missouri Bar
Commission Report, supra note 14, at 23.
21. Stith & Root, supra note 12, at 723-24.
22. Missouri Bar Commission Report, supra note 14, at 24.
23. Id.
24. Stith & Root, supra note 12, at 723. See also Judicial Selection in
Missouri, supra note 1:.
25. Judicial Selection in Missouri, supra note 13.
26. See generally Kansas Office of the Secretary of State, Kansas History,
http://www.kssos.org/forms/communication/history.pdf (last visited Aug. 14,
2010).
27. COMMITTEE FOR THE NON-POLITICAL SELECTION OF JUDGES,
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT No. 1: HERE ARE THE FACTS (on file with
author).
28. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States:
Kansas, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial selectionlindex.cfm?state=KS
(last visited Apr. 23, 2010). See also Patricia E. Riley, Merit Selection: The
Workings of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Commission, 17 K. J. L.
& PUB. PoL'Y 429, 436 (2008); Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Selection of Judges in
Kansas: A Comparison of Systems, J. KANSAS BAR AsS'N 33-35 (Jan. 2000);
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Just before the 1956 election cycle, the dominant political
party in the state, the Republicans, faced deep divisions.29
Republican Governor Fred Hall lost the party nomination to
Warren Shaw, who lost the general election to Democratic
candidate George Docking.30 Chief Justice Bill Smith, a supporter
of Hall, was ill and wished to retire from the bench, but was
uncertain that his successor, through an election, would be
ideologically like-minded.3 1 Knowing that he would no longer be
Governor, Hall negotiated a plan to allow the Chief Justice to
retire.32 Chief Justice Smith retired on December 31, Governor
Hall resigned on January 3, and Lieutenant Governor John
McCuish took office for eleven days prior to Docking's
inauguration. 33  During his eleven-day tenure as Governor,
McCuish performed only one official act: the appointment of
former Governor Hall as Chief Justice of the Kansas Supreme
Court. 34
The state legislature responded to the "triple play" by
proposing a constitutional amendment that would eliminate
popular elections and limit gubernatorial influence over judicial
appointments by instituting merit selection of Supreme Court
justices through a bipartisan nominating commission.36 The
voters supported the constitutional amendment in the 1958
elections by a sizeable margin. 3
Chief Justice Richard W. Holmes, Merit Selection of Judges, J. KANSAS BAR.
Ass'N (Aug. 1995).
29. Stacie L. Sanders, Kissing Babies, Shaking Hands, and Campaign
Contributions: Is this the Proper Role for the Kansas Judiciary?, 34
WASHBURN L. J. 573, 578 (1995).
30. Jackson, supra note 28, at 34.
31. Sanders, supra note 29, at 578.
32. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States:
Kansas, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial-selectionlindex.cfm?state=KS
(last visited Apr. 23, 2010).
33. Sanders, supra note 29, at 578.
34. Id.; Jackson, supra note 28, at 34.
36 Significantly, merit selection was proposed as an alternative to judicial
elections in 1953 and 1955, but was not successful until the "triple play"
made manipulation of the provision allowing interim appointments to be
filled, unchecked, by the sitting governor, publicly apparent. See Jackson,
supra note 28, at 34.
3 Glenn R. Winters, Selection of Judges: An Historical Introduction, 44 TEX.
L. REV. 1081, 1085 (1965).
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C. The Lessons of Missouri and Kansas
Missouri and Kansas were the first two states to adopt what
is currently known as "merit selection" to choose their state
judges,38 and therefore the stories behind the choice in these two
states are informative. The historical context is clear in both
cases - the impetus for reform was not a concern about the quality
of judges, but a concern with the ability of political and party
elites to control judicial selection and, in doing so, to manipulate
judicial decision-making based on overtly political goals. The
central lesson, then, is that the origins of merit selection rest on
public dissatisfaction with politics in the judicial process and overt
politicization of judicial selection processes. Although a few
examples of unqualified or political individuals who came to the
bench through these processes came to represent the larger
problems inherent in the system, the system was the problem, and
voters wanted to protect the integrity of the judiciary by
improving the system. Put another way, the historical origins of
merit selection rest on concerns about the external political
environment - those outside of the system were to blame for
public distrust of judicial institutions. In explaining the adoption
of merit selection in Missouri, Laurance M. Hyde explains:
[The] most important [impetus for the adoption of the
Missouri Plan] was the situation in our two large cities,
St. Louis, and Kansas City, where selection and tenure of
judges was mainly controlled by politicians, and political
machines, very apparently not working in the public
interest. Conditions were continuously getting worse so
that it was rather generally felt that something had to be
done about it . .. selection and tenure of judges depended
upon issues wholly irrelevant to any judge's ability,
record, or qualifications.3 9
38 For a full description of current merit selection states, including the year
that the system was adopted in each state, see AMERICAN JUDICATURE
SOCIETY, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION: CURRENT STATUS (2010), available at
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/JudicialMeritChartsOF
C20225EC6C2.pdf.
3 9 See generally Laurance M. Hyde, The Missouri Non-Partisan Court Plan, in
JUDICIAL SELECTION AND TENURE: SELECTED READINGS (Glenn R. Winters, ed.
1973).
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Similarly, a brochure from the 1958 Kansas campaign for merit
selection included the following:
What's Wrong with Electing Judges? First, the partisan
elective process puts the judiciary into politics.
Candidates for legislative or executive offices may run on
the basis of advocacy of certain policies; a judge should
have no policy other than to administer the law honestly
and competently. Judges should not be influenced by
political alliances or political debts.4 0
The clear intent of reform in both of these states was to create a
system where judges would be free from political pressure or
influence.
Nonetheless, widespread acceptance of merit selection in
other states came to rest on the notion that the individuals chosen
through merit selection would be different - and, on the whole,
"better" - than those who were chosen through electoral processes.
The transition in argument is not as clear as one would expect,
however. Arguments supporting judicial selection reform, and
advocating for merit selection in particular, are remarkably
consistent over time. Even the early writings of Albert Kales, as
he embarked on the project to outline some form of judicial
selection that would free a judge from the whims of public opinion
and partisan control, considered both the quality of the individual
judge produced within a given system and the propensity for the
system itself to suffer from external influence. 4 1 In Bulletin VI of
The American Judicature Society, Kales writes the following,
referring to elective systems at the time:
The supposition is that if the influence of the party
leaders can be eliminated the electorate will necessarily
make a real choice. But the electorate does not fail to
choose simply because the party leaders have taken that
choice from it. On the contrary, the party leaders rule
because the electorate regularly goes to the polls too
ignorant politically to make a choice of judges. That
40 KANSAS STATE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, THE BAsIc ISSUE IS NON-PARTISAN
vs. POLITICAL SELECTION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1958) (on file with
author).
41 JACK RABIN ET AL., HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 993-94 (3d ed.
2007).
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ignorance is due to the fact that the office of judge is
inconspicuous and the determination of who are qualified
for the office is unusually difficult, even when an expert
in possession of all the facts makes the choice . . . The
elimination of extra-legal government by party leaders
does not give to the electorate at large the knowledge
required to vote intelligently . . . The basis of choice
would, therefore, be utterly chaotic. There could be
neither responsibility nor intelligence in the selection of
judges. The results reached would depend upon chance
or upon irresponsible and temporary combinations. With
every lawyer allowed to put up his name by petition and
chance largely governing the result, the prospect is
hardly encouraging. 42
Following on the heels of Missouri and Kansas, states like
Nebraska (1962),43 Iowa (1962), Wyoming (1972), and Hawaii
(1978)44 appealed less to citizens' concerns about specific
individuals within the judicial branch than to the general sense
that an independent judiciary, untainted by political control, was
better able to deliver impartial justice. Hawaii is typical of this
argument, where merit selection proponents argued that the new
system would promote individuals who were selected "solely based
on their qualifications rather than on political patronage."45
Similarly, in Iowa, the Voters Committee for Judges and Courts,
leading the 1962 reform effort, wrote the proposed plan would (1)
42 ALBERT M. KALES, METHODS OF SELECTING AND RETIRING JUDGES, BULLETIN
VI, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, 36-37 (on file with author).
43 The term merit selection was first used in Nebraska. See Winters, supra
note 37, at 1085.
44 See American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Hawaii,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selectionlindex.cfm?state=HI (last
visited Apr. 23, 2010). It is important to note that Hawaii's method varies
from the typical model of merit selection. Id. For all appellate and circuit
court judgeships, the judicial selection commission solicits nominations and
makes recommendations to the governor. Id. The governor appoints one
person from the commission's list. Id. Then, at the end of a judge's term,
they must re-apply to the judicial selection commission and be retained by a
majority vote of the commission rather than by a vote of the people. Id. For
district courts and family courts, the chief justice makes an appointment
from a commission list; the commission also must retain district and family
court judges by majority vote. Id.
45 See id.
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remove the selection of Iowa Supreme and District Court Judges
from politics; (2) guarantee the right to vote on each District and
Supreme Court Judge on his personal record of performance after
each term of office; and (3) assure the availability and continuance
of qualified judges, freed from the uncertainties and pressures of
party politics. 4 6 Although these arguments referenced individual
qualifications, they did not explicitly propose that merit selected
judges would be different from, or better than, elected judges on a
wide array of characteristics. Instead, proponents proposed only
one critical difference in the types of judges selected under these
different systems: merit selection would prioritize an individual's
qualifications regardless of political or partisan affiliations while
elections prioritize an individual's political or partisan affiliations
regardless of their qualifications. In this argument, we see
continued emphasis on ridding the judiciary of external political
forces.
As a statement of goals, however, it is easy to see how this
proposition would be interpreted as a claim that merit selected
judges would be better than elected judges. There is an implied
assumption that selecting judges based upon political affiliations
will necessarily diminish the quality of the bench, while choosing
based on professional qualifications alone would necessarily
increase the quality of the bench.
D. The Case of Rhode Island
As the most recent state to adopt merit selection, 47 Rhode
Island's adoption of merit selection is illustrative of this more
modern conception of merit selection. Rhode Island's decision to
adopt merit selection was prompted by a series of judicial scandals
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Prior to reform, Rhode Island
chose its Supreme Court justices through the General Assembly,
46 VOTERS COMMITTEE FOR JUDGES AND COURTS, AN OPPORTUNITY FOR YOU TO
VOTE TO ASSURE IOWANS ONE OF AMERICA'S FINEST COURT SYSTEMS (1962) (on
file with author).
47 Since 1994, when Rhode Island adopted a statewide merit selection system,
other jurisdictions have moved to merit selection, most notably Greene
County, Missouri in 2008. But no other state has adopted a statewide system
since 1994. AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION:
CURRENT STATUS (2010), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/
documents/JudicialMeritCharts_0FC20225EC6C2.pdf.
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with both chambers operating together (called the "Grand
Committee") to select judges. Lower court judges were selected by
the Governor with Senate confirmation. 48 In 1986, Chief Justice
Bevilacqua resigned from the bench in order to avoid
impeachment for misuse of public funds and employees, as well as
alleged links to organized crime.49 In 1988, Bevilacqua's successor
as Chief Justice, Thomas Fay, hired the House speaker, who had
negotiated his appointment, as clerk of the high court and
administrator of the court system.50 Also in 1988, Chief Justice
Fay worked with leaders in the General Assembly to create a new
magistrate position, with Fay appointing a state Representative
who had been the floor manager for his effort to become Chief
Justice to that position.5 1 In 1993-1994, Fay and the high court's
clerk (appointed by Fay), were tried and convicted on an array of
charges that they had abused the office. 52 Meanwhile, Superior
Court Judge Antonio Almeida was convicted of accepting bribes
from a practicing attorney who appeared in his courtroom.53
Amid the turbulence of these scandals, a coalition called
RIght NOW! initiated a campaign to adopt merit selection.54 The
coalition brought together public interest groups like Common
Cause Rhode Island and the League of Women Voters with the
state Bar Association, business groups, and religious
organizations. In 1994, by a margin of 2-1, the voters of the state
adopted a constitutional amendment that created a merit selection
48 There is a general consensus that the Governor, the President of the
Senate, and the Speaker of the House alternated control over selection of
judges through an informal cooperative agreement. See American Judicature
Society, Judicial Selection in the States, http://www.judicialselection.us/
judicial_selectionlindex.cfm?state=RI (last visited Aug. 14, 2010).
4 Michael J. Yelnosky, Rhode Island's Judicial Nominating Commission:
Can "Reform" Become Reality?, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 87, 89 (1998).
See also Rhode Island History,
http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/studteaguide/RhodelslandHistory/chapt9.html
(last visited Aug. 14, 2010).
50See also Rhode Island History, http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/studteaguide/
RhodelslandHistory/chapt9.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2010).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Id.
54American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States,
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicialselectionlindix.cfm?state=Rl (last
visited Aug. 14, 2010).
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system to choose judges.55
The context for reform in Rhode Island, then, combines a
systemic concern about the external influence of political elites
who manipulated the judicial branch to advance their personal
interests with a personnel concern about the integrity and dignity
of the individuals who populated the bench. Unlike Missouri and
Kansas, where reform was driven by concern about outside actors
who were attempting to subvert the judiciary for political
purposes, reform in Rhode Island was driven by concerns about
those who served inside the judiciary.56
Rhode Island is hardly alone, however. Consider the case of
Oklahoma, where the impetus for selection reform - and adoption
of merit selection - came in the mid-1960s, when a Supreme Court
justice was convicted on charges of bribery, and another was
impeached and removed from office.57 Even as these two justices
were immersed in scandal, a former justice had been convicted for
tax evasion and was serving time in federal detention.58 One
journalist at the time went so far as to say that the scandals were
"one of the blackest marks ever on state government."59 Like
Rhode Island, the reform was initiated with an intention to
improve the quality of the individuals selected to serve on the
bench. A pamphlet advocating reform read:
Our practice of electing judges who must 'run' on a party
ticket defeats our concept of the impartial administration
55Rhode Island History, http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/studteaguide/RhodeIsland
History/chapt9.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2010).
66 Even prior to the move to merit selection, the concern for personnel was at
the center of judicial selection in Rhode Island. In an executive order dated
August 10, 1984, Governor J. Joseph Garrahy established an advisory
commission on judicial appointments, continuing a process in existence since
1977. The executive order begins: "Whereas the quality and integrity of
Rhode Island's judicial system is determined largely by the character and
ability of judges serving in such capacities . . ." Exec. Order No. 84-8 (Aug.
10, 1984) (on file with author).
57American Judicature Society, http://www.judicialselection.us/judiciaL
selectionlindix.cfm?state=ok (last visited Aug. 15, 2010). It is important to
recognize that Oklahoma was among the first states to consider merit
selection in 1962. Balanced Bench in Oklahoma, OK. CITY TIMES, Sept. 3,
1962. Merit selection, however, was not adopted until the personnel concerns
arose from scandal.
58 American Judicature Society, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial
selectionlindix.cfm?state-ok (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).
59 Id.
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of justice - for these reasons: Because political influence
may outweigh judicial qualifications in a man's getting on
a party ticket. An excellent politician may be also a good
judge, but all good judges are not necessarily good
politicians . . . Because a judge may be tempted to be
partial in a case if his political future or renomination is
at stake.60
The campaign was successful, and Oklahoma voters adopted
constitutional amendments that switched district court elections
from partisan to nonpartisan contests, and adopted merit selection
for all of the state's appellate judges and all interim appointments
to the district courts.6 1
Likewise, a failed attempt to adopt merit selection through
the "local option" for Florida district courtS6 2 in 2000 was
advocated primarily as a way to improve judicial personnel.
Advocates of commission-based appointment relied heavily on the
rates of disciplinary actions against sitting judges, arguing that
merit selection would promote more qualified judges who would be
less prone to these lapses in judgment, thereby promoting a better
judiciary.63 The initiative failed in every county.64
E. Combining the Systemic with Personnel
Every judicial selection system is, at its core, a process of
determining how outside non-judicial actors (citizens, governors,
legislatures) will choose those who work inside the judicial
system, those who will give shape and meaning to the abstract
60 See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF OKLAHOMA, THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE IS YOUR BUSINESS (1964) (on file with author).
61 American Judicature Society, http://www.judicalselection.us/judicial-
selectionlindix.cfm?state=ok (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).
62 The so-called "local option" permits individual counties to adopt merit
selection without any statewide merit selection system. Witness the adoption
of merit selection in Greene County, Missouri, and an unsuccessful campaign
to nix merit selection in Johnson County, Kansas in 2008. Similarly, two
counties in Alabama adopted merit selection for interim vacancies in 2008.
63 A second argument focused on the increase in campaign contributions and
the possibility that the conflicts of interest arising from campaign
contributions would only exacerbate the problems with ethical behavior on
the bench. American Judicature Society, http://www.judicialselection/us/
judicial_selection/indix.cfm?state-fl (last visited Aug. 15, 2010).64 Id.
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notion of judicial authority. Judicial selection, then, is by its very
nature an effort to determine the systemic process that will
determine personnel. While the immediate environment that
gives rise to judicial selection reform in any state may focus
attention on one or the other, the design of a judicial selection
system necessarily implicates both simultaneously. Nonetheless,
the historical record of reform coming from concerns about the
system rather than the individuals can help us untangle the ways
that merit selection is "different." The difference comes both in
the role of extra-judicial actors and the characteristics of those
individuals who are chosen to serve. Any effort to examine how
merit-selected judges differ from elected or appointed65 judges
requires that we ignore the equally important examination of how
non-judicial actors influence the judiciary, as it focuses exclusively
on those who are chosen, rather than the question of how extra-
judicial actors have influenced the process.
Yet generations of scholars have turned their attention to this
question, with mixed success. Given the generalized claim that
merit selection will not only lessen the influence of political forces
within the justice system, but will also elevate highly qualified
individuals to the bench, the claim that those jurists chosen
through merit selection will be fundamentally different than those
elected to the bench deserves considerable attention. This
attention has come at the expense of the equally compelling
question of whether merit selection fundamentally alters the
ability of non-judicial actors to manipulate the choice of judges or
judicial decisions and the extent to which this manipulation
occurs. 6 6 In an effort to meld these two questions as much as is
65 Judges are appointed by the governor without the aid of a nominating
commission in a number of states. See Appendix for a breakdown of states
that use each method of selection.
66 There have been a number of claims that merit selection permits the bar to
have extraordinary influence in the choice of judges. The scholars who make
these claims argue that providing the bar with a role in the process privileges
a set of elite political goals at the expense of average Americans' input. See
for example, a lawsuit in Alaska challenging the state's merit selection
system on exactly these grounds. See generally Stephen J. Ware, The Bar's
Extraordinarily Powerful Role in Selecting the Kansas Supreme Court, 18
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 392, 392-427 (2010). See also Stephen J. Ware, The
Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 Mo. L. REV. 751, 755-64 (2009).
There is little empirical evidence, however, to support these claims. Although
some have attempted to test the role of the bar, the data has significant
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practical, the discussion offered here attempts to expand
traditional considerations of how merit-selected judges might
differ by including some new lines of research regarding the
influence of outside actors.
II. How DIFFERENT ARE JUDGES CHOSEN THROUGH MERIT
SELECTION?
To assess how merit-selected judges may differ from judges
chosen in elective or appointive systems, I examine a number of
ways that we might expect judges to differ based on the system
under which they were selected. The debate over merit selection
has focused on a few key assumptions about how each system of
selection will function, and these arguments form the basis for the
discussion.
The most prominent point of debate references the "quality" of
judges selected in elective, appointive, and merit selection
systems. This debate has inevitably stalled because of the
difficulty in determining what we mean by "quality." Judges are
asked to perform many tasks, and the job of judging is notoriously
difficult to reduce to easily measured qualities.67 Judges are
expected to exhibit personal, professional, and judicial
characteristics, which are sometimes contradictory. We expect
"good judges," for example, to be firm and decisive, yet we also
hope that they will be deliberative, respectful, and patient. We
expect judges to be well-trained in the law and impartial in their
decisions (implying that all "good" judges should reach the same
conclusion) at the same time that we recognize the value of having
flaws. Most notably, Professor Brian Fitzpatrick examined the list of
individuals who were recommended by the nominating commission in
Tennessee and attributed a party affiliation to each of them based upon
uneven, inconsistent data on their participation in party primary elections.
Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The Politics of Merit Selection, 74 Mo. L. REV. 675, 693
(2009). For example, if a recommended individual had participated in ten
primary elections, six as a republican and four as a democrat, he would be
labeled a republican for Fitzpatrick's purposes. Id. Like Rhode Island,
Tennessee is dominated by one political party, and the choice to vote in a
party primary may just as likely be a strategic calculation as an expression of
political preferences.
67 Rosenberg, supra note 5. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant of
Quantitative Studies of Judges, Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper
#08-0159 78-79 (St. John's Univ., Nov. 2008) (on file with author).
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diversity on the bench (implying that race, gender, religion, and
other characteristics will necessarily influence a judge's
interpretations of the law).68 Those who prioritize accountability
to the public claim that a "good" judge will be responsive to public
opinion on prominent legal, political, and social issues, but public
opinion polls widely report that voters want the judicial branch to
remain free from political influence. 69 To say that we can easily
compare judges selected through different systems requires us to
directly address the contradictions inherent in doing so.
Here, I select some possible characteristics that might help us
define "quality" judges, recognizing that the list is necessarily
incomplete. What we find, however, is that there are predictable
ways in which merit-selected judges differ from their elected and
appointed colleagues.
A. Legal Experience & Professional Background
The earliest studies of how merit selection matters focused
attention on the professional and legal background of judges. 70 In
examining these patterns, research indicated little difference
between merit-selected judges and those who reached the bench
through other methods.71 Most notably, Henry R. Glick and Craig
68 The most recent example of this contradictory set of expectations is,
clearly, the Senate hearings on the confirmation of Justice Sotomayor related
to her comments about a "wise latina" who would be better qualified to reach
fair decisions. Despite widespread acceptance of Justice Alito's explanation
that his background and family experiences would make him more aware of
and more sensitive to the claims of immigrants, Justice Sotomayor's
comments were widely used to discredit the idea that she would be impartial
in her decisions. See American Bar Ass'n, Is the 'Wise Latina" a Myth?,
available at www.abanow.org/?s=wuse+latine+myth.
69 For example, a poll of Pennsylvania voters found that seventy percent
believed it was "very important" that judges be "independent of politics;" at
the same time, seventy percent reported that they thought it "very
important" that judges be "representative of the values of their community."
See BELDEN, RussONELLO & STEWART, QUALITY COUNTS: MAKING THE CASE OF
MERIT SELECTION (Mar. 2002) (on file with author).
7o As comparison is always a tricky business, prior scholars have repeatedly
cautioned against drawing too many conclusions without adequately
controlling for regional differences. See generally Philip L. Dubois, The
Influence of Selection System and Region on the Characteristics of a Trial
Court Bench: The Case of California, JUST. SYS. J. (1983); Bradley C. Canon,
The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics of Judges -
Reconsidered, L. AND Soc'Y REV. (1972).
71 See Larry L. Berg et al., The Consequences of Judicial Reform: A
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F. Emmert's exhaustive examination of all state high court judges
in 1980 and 1981 found few differences in the qualifications or
educational backgrounds of merit-selected or elected judges.72
Among those differences they did find, appointed judges (both
chosen through merit selection systems as well as those chosen
through gubernatorial appointment without the use of a
nominating commission) were significantly less likely to be born in
the state in which they serve, less likely to have completed their
undergraduate education in the state, and more likely to have
attended a prestigious law school.73  Merit-selected judges,
moreover, were more likely to have governmental experience
(including partisan positions) than judges selected in other
systems.74 Most importantly, Glick and Emmert's findings, like
those of scholars before them, indicated that judges selected in
partisan elections were more likely to have more years of legal
experience, while appointed judges are more likely to have
practiced law in large firms.75
The difficulty with this line of inquiry is that it is unclear
exactly why one should expect significant differences in
background characteristics - like years of experience, size of law
firm, and in-state or out-of-state law school - as these are unlikely
to capture those qualities that are most important to the
enterprise of judging, nor is it clear why these particular qualities
are measured. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that little recent
work has been done on this question. It is undoubtedly more
significant to focus on the work that judges do.
B. Diversity
Because of the judge's unique role within the American justice
Comparative Analysis of the California and Iowa Appellate Systems, 28 W.
POLITICAL Q. 263 (1975); RICHARD A. WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE
POLITICS OF BENCH AND BAR (1969). The notable exception to this general
conclusion that the selection system does not alter the characteristics of
judges is Herbert Jacob, The Effect of Institutional Differences in the
Recruitment Process: The Case of State Judges, 13 J. PUB. L. 104 (1964).
72 See generally Henry R. Glick & Craig F. Emmert, Selection Systems and
Judicial Characteristics: The Recruitment of State Supreme Court Judges, 70
JUDICATURE 228 (1987).
7 Id. at 231-32.
74 Id. at 232-33.
7. Id. at 231-33.
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system, scholars have recently directed attention to the diversity
of the bench, and the degree to which the judicial system
adequately represents minorities and women. Although race or
gender are not typically among the most significant
characteristics directly related to job performance, there have
been notable claims that these traits have a large effect not only
in how an individual judge approaches the task of rendering
decisions but also in establishing greater public confidence in the
decisions rendered. Existing studies have produced vastly
different results about the effects of judicial selection systems on
gender and racial diversity on the state bench, however. 76 Some
scholars have found that merit selection is less likely to advance
the goal of a diverse bench.77 Other studies have found that
appointive selection systems advance judicial diversity. For
example, in a study of women and minorities on courts in all fifty
states, M.L. Henry concluded that "the success of women and
minorities in achieving judicial office depends in large measure
upon the method of selection," finding that appointive systems
were much more effective in creating a diverse bench than
electoral systems.7 8 Similarly, a more recent study found that
some types of appointive systems tend to favor African American
candidates of both genders.79  Other scholars have noticed a
76 It is important to note that some scholars have found no relationship
between method of selection and diversity on the bench. See, e.g., Mark S.
Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Women and Minorities on State and Federal
Appellate Benches: A Cross-Time Comparison, 1985-1999, 85 JUDICATURE 84
(2001); Nicholas 0. Alozie, Selection Methods and the Recruitment of Women
to State Courts of Last Resort, 77 Soc. SCIENCE Q. 110 (1996); Nicholas 0.
Alozie, Black Representation on State Judiciaries, 69 Soc. SCIENCE Q. 979
(1988).
77 See, e.g., Mark S. Hurwitz & Drew Noble Lanier, Explaining Judicial
Diversity: The Differential Ability of Women and Minorities to Attain Seats of
State Supreme and Appellate Courts, 3 STATE POLITICS AND POL'Y Q. 329, 338-
39 (2003) (finding that merit selection produced a lower proportion of
minority judges in 1985, but that this effect had diminished by 1999); GARY S.
BROWN, CHARACTERISTICS OF ELECTED VERSUS MERIT-SELECTED NEW YORK
CITY JUDGES, 1992-1997 (1998) (finding that elective systems produced more
minority and women jurists in New York City from 1992-1997).
78 See Kevin M. Esterling & Seth S. Andersen, Diversity and the Judicial
Merit Selection Process: A Statistical Report, in RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL
SELECTION (Am. Judicature Society 1999); M.L. HENRY, THE SUCCESS OF
WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE 65 (1985).
7 See generally ELAINE MARTIN & BARRY PAYLE, GENDER AND THE RACIAL
DIVERSIFICATION OF STATE SUPREME COURTS, WOMEN AND POLITICS (2002).
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"threshold effect," whereby appointive systems provide gender
diversity to formerly all-male courts, but the effect may not hold
once the court is initially diversified.80
While there has been considerable disagreement about the
nature of the relationship, some methodological deficiencies have
hindered prior research. Most studies of diversity have relied
upon the states' formal methods of selection, ignoring the fact that
individual judges often reach the bench through informal
mechanisms such as vacancy appointments. 81  In addition,
existing research typically limits the scope of inquiry to a single
set of states or a single set of courts, most often state supreme
courts. Recent research has attempted to resolve these problems
by collecting information on each individual judge and the method
by which they first attained their seat on the bench.82 The data
represents all appellate state court judges who were sitting in
2008 and a random sample of ten percent of all state court judges
sitting on state trial courts of general jurisdiction. The results,
depicted in Table I, indicate that more women and minorities
reach the bench through merit selection than through any other
selection process. For minority jurists, substantially higher
proportions of appellate judges are merit-selected, although this
pattern does not hold for trial courts of general jurisdiction.
Women on state supreme courts are more likely to be appointed
through merit selection, although partisan elections are more
effective at promoting women to the intermediate appellate courts,
s0 See, e.g., Lisa M. Holmes & Jolly A. Emrey, Court Diversification: Staffing
the State Courts of Last Resort Through Interim Appointments, 27 JUsT. SYs.
J. 1-13 (2006) (finding that interim appointments are also effective at
diversifying all-white or all-male courts); Kathleen A. Bratton & Rorie L.
Spill, Existing Diversity and Judicial Selection: The Role of the Appointment
Method in Establishing Gender Diversity in State Supreme Courts, 83 Soc.
SCIENCE Q. 504-18 (2002).
81 A number of states use merit selection only for interim vacancies, so the
"formal" selection system may be elections, but an individual judge may be
chosen through the "informal" process where they are initially appointed to
the bench. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE
STATES: APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS, available at
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/JudicialSelectionCharts
1196376173077.pdf.
82 See generally Malia Reddick, Michael J. Nelson, and Rachel Paine
Caufield, Racial and Gender Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study, 48
JUDGE'S J. 28 (2009).
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and gubernatorial appointment without a nominating commission
is the most prominent path to the bench for women serving on
trial courts. Multivariate analysis indicates that democratic
governors are most likely to appoint women and minorities, and
the best predictor of judicial diversity is the proportion of minority
and women attorneys in the state.83
C. Judicial Decisions and Ideology
Judicial selection reform has generally been fostered by the
idea that changes in selection system will limit the ideological or
political influence on individual judicial performance. The degree
to which elected, appointed, or merit-selected judges exhibit
decisional independence, then, is key to understanding the ability
of the system to insulate judicial decisions from popular or
political retaliation. Furthermore, the extent to which judicial
decisions are ideologically different can tell us whether merit
selection produces ideological implications for the bench.84
Some research on this question indicated little if any
difference in judges' propensity to support plaintiffs in personal
injury litigation,85 sentencing behavior in DWI cases,86 or supreme
court decisions on racial discrimination claims. 87 Nonetheless, a
number of other scholars have found significant differences
between elected and appointed judges. Appointive state supreme
courts, for example, were found to be significantly more likely to
uphold sex discrimination claims.88 Particularly on those cases
that are most salient - capital cases - research has demonstrated
that appointed judges are more likely to oppose the death penalty
while elected judges' decisions reflect the level of partisan
83 Id. at 30.
8 Some have argued that the merit selection process institutionalizes the role
of the bar and therefore produces more judges who are sympathetic to trial
lawyers. See generally Fitzpatrick, supra note 66.
85 See WATSON & DOWNING, supra note 71, at 324-26.
86 Jerome O'Callaghan, Another Test for the Merit Plan, 14 JUST. SYS. J., 477,
482 (1991).
87 Francine Sanders Romero, David W. Romero and Victoria Ford, The
Influence of Selection Method on Racial Discrimination Cases: A Longitudinal
State Supreme Court Analysis, 2 RESEARCH ON JUDICIAL SELECTION, 17, 27
(Am. Judicature Society 2002).
88 See Gerard S. Gryski, Eleanor C. Main & William J. Dixon, Models of State
High Court Decision Making in Sex Discrimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143
(1986).
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competition in the state, with highly competitive states leading to
more judicial decisions to impose the death penalty.89 Likewise, in
a study of criminal cases, with a focus on criminal procedure,
appointed judges were more likely to rule in favor of the defendant
over the state.90 For those that wish to see courts be faithful to
public opinion (an external force, surely), a substantial body of
work has clearly indicated - that elected judges give harsher
punishments and more often sentence people to death than merit
selected judges. For those that value the independence of the
judiciary and value independent decisions that reflect respect for
political minorities and the dispossessed based on legal
protections, this body of research would confirm that merit-
selected judges are freer to diverge from popular opinion. While
this may not reflect any clear ideological distinction based on the
method of selection, there are systematic differences in judicial
decisions.
Most recently, some scholars assert that merit selection
systems favor "the lawyer class," which is assumed to be liberal. 91
It is therefore worth examining the general propensity of merit
selection systems to be "captured" by liberal lawyers and, as a
result, make decisions that are unfavorable to business. The
Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform (ILR) rankings
are illustrative, as they convey some information about whether
merit selection is detrimental to the business community. In fact,
the 2008 rankings are particularly telling. Assessing the
treatment of tort and contract litigation, the five states rated the
highest all use merit selection of judges, while the five states rated
the lowest all use contested elections. Similarly, all five of the top
rated states for punitive damages appoint their appellate judges,92
while three of the five worst elect their appellate judges. In rating
the impartiality of a state's judges, three of the top five states
have adopted merit selection, one state uses legislative
appointment, and another state, Minnesota, uses nonpartisan
89 See Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, Studying Courts Comparatively: The
View from the American States, 48 POL. RES. Q. 5 (1995).
9o DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-
SUPREME-COURT POLICY: INNOVATION, REACTION, AND ATROPHY 73-104 (1995).
91 Fitzpatrick, supra note 66, at 690-91.
92 One of the top five, Maine, uses a gubernatorial appointment system
without a nominating commission.
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elections. However, a large percentages of Minnesota judges (as
high as 96%) are appointed under a merit selection plan for
interim vacancies; the same is true for the Chamber's assessment
of judges' competence. Overall, even the most cursory look at the
ILR's rankings tells the story clearly: all of the top five states use
appointment methods, whereas all of the lowest five states use
contested elections. This evidence clearly refutes any claim that
trial lawyers are dominating merit selection procedures and
fostering judicial institutions that are hostile to business.
D. Work Product
A prominent line of research by Choi, Gulati and Posner 93
assesses the work product of state courts, in order to develop an
alternative ranking to the Chamber of Commerce ILR ranking
system. 9 4 Their specific concern is that the Chamber of Commerce
studies are based on a survey of attorneys at large national firms
who may favor big business interests.95 As such, the ILR rankings
do not provide an unbiased assessment of state judiciaries,
whereas other more objective measures may yield different
results. Choi, Gulati, and Posner have, therefore, based their
rankings on judicial decisions to determine (1) which courts are
most likely to produce high quality opinions (as measured by the
number of citations by other out-of-state courts); (2) which courts
produce the most opinions; and (3) which judges are most
independent (as measured by whether a judge votes along party
lines).96
In terms of productivity, the study demonstrates that elected
93 Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, Which States Have the Best
(and Worst) High Courts?, John M. Olin Law and Economics Working Paper
No. 405, available at HTTP://PAPERS.SSRN.COM/SOL3/PAPERS.
CFM?ABSTRACTID=1130358; Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper
No. 2172 (2008), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edulfiles/files/405.pdf.
94 A few political scientists have developed similar measures in the past,
including GREGORY A. CALDIERA, ON THE REPUTATION OF STATE SUPREME
COURTS, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1983) (state supreme court "reputation" scores
measuring citations), and ScoTT A. CAMPARATO, ON THE REPUTATION OF STATE
SUPREME COURTS REVISITED, REMARKS PRESENTED AT THE ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE MIDWEST POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION (2002) (updating Caldiera's
measures).
9 This is precisely why the ILR survey is so valuable in assessing whether
state judiciaries are hostile to business.
96 See Choi, Gulati, & Posner, supra note 93.
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judges, especially those selected in partisan elections, write the
most opinions. 97 California, which uses appointment to select
Supreme Court justices, with consent of the Commission on
Judicial Appointments, and Delaware, which has an appointed
judiciary through a merit selection process instituted through
executive order, rank as the states that are most influential and
most cited by other high-courts. 98  However, Montana and
Washington, which select their high-courts through nonpartisan
elections, follow close behind Delaware in regard to how
frequently their high-courts are cited by out-of-state high-courts.99
Massachusetts, which uses merit selection and lifetime
appointment, completes the top five.100 Accordingly, in regard to
reputation, there are no significant differences between judges in
states that use merit selection and those in states using other
methods of judicial selection.101 Lastly, the study finds that Rhode
Island, New York, Oregon, Utah, and Oklahoma's civil courts rank
at the top in terms of independence. 102 Of these five, only
Oregon's high court is elected in nonpartisan elections.103 The
other four have all implemented a merit selection system for their
high courts.104
These measures offer a mixed review of which methods of
selection yield the "best" judges. It is clear from the independence
rankings that there are fewer ideological forces at work among
merit-selected judges, and accordingly, less partisan influence.
While elected judges may produce more opinions, if those opinions
are driven by ideological factors, then that productivity may not
make up for the partisanship ensconced within the judiciary.
97 The study also illustrates that there is a correlation between the salary and
the productivity of elected judges. See Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 93.
98 Id. at 16.
99 d.
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 17.
103 Id.
104 Id. The authors characterize Rhode Island and New York as appointment
systems, but both states have adopted a merit selection system for their high
courts. See Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and General
Jurisdiction Courts (2010), available at http://www.judicialselection.us/
uploads/documents/JudicialSelectionCharters1196376173077.pdf.
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E. Ethics
Most pertinent to states that implemented merit selection in
the wake of judicial scandals, such as Rhode Island, a "good" judge
is one who recognizes the power of the position and respects the
dignity of the office. Studies of judicial discipline indicate that
merit selection promotes individuals who are less likely to be
disciplined for judicial indiscretions. For example, an examination
of New York City judges found that elected judges serving on the
City's Civil Court were substantially more likely to face
disciplinary action than appointed judges serving on the City's
Supreme Courts and Family Courts.105 Similarly, in California,
elected judges have higher disciplinary rates than appointed
judges.106 Moreover, the Florida Bar reports that since 1970, ten
of the thirteen judges who have been removed from the bench
pursuant to disciplinary proceedings were elected rather than
merit-selected; since 1998, seventy-three percent of judges who
were disciplined were initially elected to the bench. 107
Comparing disciplinary rates is a difficult task, as state
provisions and enforcement regimes vary considerably. 108 A
recent study examining judges in nine states, all of which have
mixed systems where a judge may be initially appointed through
merit selection or initially elected, indicates that disciplinary rates
are significantly lower for appointed judges.109 Using a quasi-
105 Steven Zeidman, To Elect or Not To Elect: A Case Study of Judicial
Selection in New York City 1977-2002, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 791, 810
(2004).
106 See State of California Commission on Judicial Performance, Summary of
Discipline Statistics 1990-1999, available at http://www.cjp.ca.gov/usefiles/
file/miscellaneous/reportsumstats_90TO99.pdf.107 Id.
108 Research by Goldschmidt, et al. examines the relationship between
discipline and selection systems, but suffers from two problems. First, it
analyzes aggregate data, thereby minimizing the very significant differences
between states. Second, the research classifies judges based upon the
"formal" selection system within the state, which fails to recognize the large
number of judges who initially come to the bench through "informal"
procedures to fill vacancies. See generally lona Goldschmidt, David Olson &
Margarget Eikman, The Relationship Between Method of Judicial Selection
and Judicial Misconduct, 18 WIDENER L.J. 455, 455-90 (2009).
109 Malia Reddick, Judging the Quality of Judicial Selection Methods: Merit
Selection, Elections, and Judicial Discipline (2010), available at
http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/JudgingQualityJudSelectMethods.pdf.
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experimental design to control for the state's rules as well as its
enforcement, Reddick (2010) finds that the proportion of merit
selected judges who are disciplined is significantly lower than the
proportion of all merit selected judges in the state in six of the
nine states studied.110 These findings suggest that concerns about
the people serving on the bench can be alleviated by merit
selection. In other words, merit selection does, indeed, result in
more ethical judges than elections.
III. WHAT MAKES MERIT SELECTION DIFFERENT?
Over the past seven decades, states have opted for merit
selection to address two distinct concerns about their state
judiciaries: external political influences on the judiciary and the
individuals who serve inside the judiciary. An evaluation of the
types of judges who are selected reflects these arguments. Early
studies examining differences in judges' personal background
found little evidence to support a shift to merit selection, but these
early studies, focusing on educational or geographic background,
have little relation to the real concerns that gave rise to reform.
From a practical perspective, states that suffered significant
systemic or personnel problems found merit selection to be a way
of removing either outside political forces (systemic) or unfit
individuals (personnel) from the bench. From a systemic
perspective, merit selected judges (1) appear to be more
independent from partisan influences, and (2) may be less likely to
reflect popular sentiment in their decisions, especially with regard
to the rights of the accused and defendants in capital cases. From
a personnel perspective, merit selection has helped to bring more
diverse individuals to the bench and has resulted in more ethical
judges.
The debate that continues to frame decisions about which
method of selection is preferable reflects deep division about these
forces, as some believe that judges should reflect the same
political forces that motivate other elected officials or that
elections are the most effective way to eliminate unfit judges.
Merit selection proponents have long argued that merit selection
is preferable because it provides a bipartisan screening process
110Id.
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that can avoid populating the bench with unqualified individuals.
At the same time, merit selection promotes a bipartisan decision
about which individuals are most likely to serve with distinction.
Finally, proponents argue that merit selection removes overt
political influence from the courts, allowing judges to remain
faithful to the law. Merit selection is not a panacea and care must
be taken to ensure that these systems use policies and procedures
that foster meaningful and thoughtful deliberation. Looking at
the broad array of measures that we can use to evaluate the
differences that may be attributable to selection systems, it is
clear that differences do emerge. More importantly, those
differences reflect real improvements to the situations and
circumstances that originally gave rise to the movement to initiate
merit selection.
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Appendix: Summary of Initial Selection Methods for Appellate and General Jurisdiction
CourtsII
Merit Selection Gubernatorial (G) Partisan Election Nonpartisan Combined Merit
or Legislative (L) Election Selection and
Appointment Other Methods
Alaska California (G) Alabama Arkansas Arizona
Colorado Maine (G) Illinois Georgia Florida
Connecticut New Jersey (G) Louisiana Idaho Indiana
Delaware Virginia (L) Ohio Kentucky Kansas
District of South Carolina (L) Pennsylvania Michigan Missouri
Columbia
Hawaii Texas Minnesota New York
Iowa West Virginia Mississippi Oklahoma
Maryland Montana South Dakota
Massachusetts Nevada Tennessee
Nebraska North Carolina
New Hampshire North Dakota
New Mexico Oregon
Rhode Island Washington
Utah Wisconsin
Vermont
Wyoming
" For details on each state and the methods ofjudicial selection used, see Judicial Selection in the States:
Appellate and General Jurisdiction Courts (2010), available at
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/JudicialSelectionCharts_1196376173077.pdf.
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TABLE I: Selection Methods and Diversity on State Courts 112
Courts of Intermediate General Jurisdiction
Last Resort Appellate Courts Trial Courts Total
Racial/Ethnic Minorities
Merit 54.3% 40.8% 25.5% 36.6%
Selection (19) (49) (26) (94)
Gubernatorial 31.4% 22.5% 35.3% 28.8%
Appointment (11) (27) (36) (74)
Partisan 11.4% 25.0% 27.5% 24.1%
Election (4) (30) (28) (62)
Nonpartisan 2.9% 3.3% 8.8% 5.4%
Election (1) (4) (9) (14)
Legislative --- 0.8% 2.9% 1.2%
Election (1) (2) (3)
Court --- 7.5% 1.0% 3.9%
Appointment (9) (1) (10)
(35) (120) (102) (257)
Women
Merit 48.5% 27.5% 30.2% 32.1%
Selection (50) (77) (60) (187)
Gubernatorial 17.5% 28.6% 28.1% 26.5%
Appointment (18) (80) (56) (154)
Partisan 19.4% 29.3% 24.1% 25.8%
Election (20) (82) (48) (150)
Nonpartisan 10.7% 6.1% 12.1% 8.9%
Election (11) (17) (24) (52)
Legislative 1.9% 1.4% 2.0% 1.7%
Election (2) (4) (4) (10)
Court 1.9% 7.2% 3.5% 5.0%
Appointment (2) (20) (7) (29)
(103) (280) (199) (582)
112 Figures represent percentages and numbers of minority and women judges
by selection method. Data includes all state appellate judges and a random
sample of ten percent of all states trial court judges. Each judge is characterized
according to the actual method. Malia Reddick, Michael J. Nelson, and Rachel
Paine Caufield, Racial and Gender Diversity on State Courts: An AJS Study,
The Judges Journal, v. 48 (28-32) at 31.
